Jin-Wook Chang | The Lehman Brothers' 2008 bankruptcy spread losses to its counterparties even when Lehman was a lender of cash, because collateral for that lending was tied up in the bankruptcy process. I study the implications of such lender default using a general equilibrium network model featuring endogenous leverage, endogenous asset prices, and endogenous network formation. The multiplex graph model has two channels of contagion: a counterparty channel of contagion and a price channel of contagion through endogenous collateral price. Borrowers diversify their lenders because of the counterparty risk, but they have to deal with lenders who lend at a higher margin. This diversification generates positive externalities by reducing systemic risk, but any decentralized equilibrium is constrained inefficient due to under-diversification. The key externalities here, arising from the tradeoff between counterparty risk and leverage (margin), are absent in models with exogenous leverage or exogenous networks. I use this framework to analyze the introduction of a central counterparty (CCP). I show that the loss coverage by the CCP reduces diversification incentives and exacerbates the externality problem which can rather increase systemic risk.

Emily Liu, Friederike Niepmann, and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr | This paper shows that monetary policy and prudential policies interact. U.S. banks issue more commercial and industrial loans to emerging market borrowers when U.S. monetary policy eases. The effect is less pronounced for banks that are more constrained through the U.S. bank stress tests, reflected in a lower minimum capital ratio in the severely adverse scenario. This suggests that monetary policy spillovers depend on banks’ capital constraints. In particular, during a period of quantitative easing when liquidity is abundant, banks are more flexible, and the scope for adjusting lending is larger when they have a bigger capital buffer. We conjecture that bank lending to emerging markets during the zero-lower bound period would have been even higher had the United States not introduced stress tests for their banks.

David P. Glancy, John R. Krainer, Robert J. Kurtzman, and Joseph B. Nichols | Banks, life insurers, and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) lenders originate the vast majority of U.S. commercial real estate (CRE) loans. While these lenders compete in the same market, they differ in how they are funded and regulated, and therefore specialize in loans with different characteristics. We harmonize loan-level data across the lenders and review how their CRE portfolios differ. We then exploit cross-sectional differences in loan portfolios to estimate a simple model of frictional substitution across lender types. The substitution patterns in the model match well the observed shift of borrowers away from CMBS when CMBS spreads rose in 2016.

Nathan Converse and Enrico Mallucci | How does sovereign risk affect investors' behavior? We answer this question using a novel database that combines sovereign default probabilities for 27 developed and emerging markets with monthly data on the portfolios of individual bond mutual funds. We first show that changes in yields do not fully compensate investors for additional sovereign risk, so that bond funds reduce their exposure to a country's assets when its sovereign default risk increases. However, the magnitude of the response varies widely across countries. Fund managers aggressively reduce their exposure to high-debt countries and high-risk countries. By contrast, they are more lenient toward core developed markets. In this sense, these economies appear to receive preferential treatment. Second, we document what determines the destination of reallocation ows. When fund managers reduce their exposure to a country in response to its sovereign risk, they shift their assets to countries outside the immediate geographic region while at the same time avoiding countries with high debt-to-GDP ratios and markets to which they are already heavily exposed. These results are supportive of models of sovereign default that assign a nontrivial role to the preferences of international creditors.